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In this paper it is argued that there is an important protectionist bias
inherent in free trade agreements which is not present in custom unions. In
any customs union or free trade agreement, one of the critical issues concerns
"rules of origin." In a free trade agreement rules of origin have an important
function because, without one, each imported commodity would enter through
the country with the lowest tariff on each commodity. The criterion for
duty-free treatment is important in determining the economic effects of the rule
of origin. It is shown that rules of origin in fact extend the protection accorded
by each country to producers in other free trade agreement member countries.
As such, rules of origin can constitute a source of bias toward economic







and NBERUntil recently, little attention was paid to
free trade agreements (FTAs),and most theory
regarding preferential trading arrangements focussed
on customs unions (CUs). With the recent negotiation
of the NAFTA treaty, however, attention is turning to
FTAs.Most analysts have regarded FTAs as being
little different in their trade effects from CUs, and
the NAFTA has mostly been analyzed in the traditional
CU framework. For example, it has been argued that the
U.S.—Mexican FTA is probably "natural" and hence
likely to be trade creating, increasing economic
efficiency1 and thus enhancing welfare.2
1Throughout,economic efficiency will be used to
describe the relationship between marginal rates in
domestic production in trade in value added terms. A
situation will be regarded as economically more
efficient when resources are combined in ways that
produce greater value added evaluated at international
prices. It is well known that IVA is maximized, and
hence the economy economically most efficient, when
the international marginal rates of transformation
(IMRTs) (which equals international price ratios in
the absence of monopoly power in trade) among
commodities equal the domestic marginal rates of
transformation(DMRTs). However,welfarealso
increases when consumers are enabled to attain larger
consumption bundles. It is well known that one might
have a customs union where the divergence between the
INRT and DMRT increased, but consumer welfare improved
because of lower post—FTA prices. For that reason, it
isimportanttodistinguish betweeneconomic
efficiencyandeconomicwelfare. Ifeconomic
efficiency increases, welfare must increase. If
efficiency decreases, welfare could either increase or
decrease.
1It is the purpose of this paper to argue that
there is an important protectionist bias inherent in
FTAs which is not present in CUs. To make the case, it
is first necessary to sketch the traditional analysis
of the welfare effects of CUs and FTAs. Thereafter,
attention turns to the fact that external tariffs
differ among countries in FTAs, and that rules of
origin (ROOs) can therefore can automatically extend
the protection of one trading partner to another FTA
member. A straightforward model of incentives under an
FTA is then presented, along with an arithmetic
exampleof "exported protection" via an FTA.
Conventional wisdom has been that a country can
avoid the potential trade—diversion losses of an FTA
if it has very low, or no, trade barriers when it
enters into an FTA. Examination of the implications of
ROOS, however, suggests that not only must a country's
trade barriers be low, but so also must its partner's,
to insure that these costs are avoided. A final
section then considers some aspects of the political
economy of FTAs and of protection via ROOs.
1. Traditional CU—FTA Theory
It has long been recognized that the net
welfare effects of customs unions and free trade areas
2See Summers (1991) for an application of this
analysis to the proposed Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Agreement (WHFTA).
2are ambiguous. To analyze the problem of the welfare
effects of CU, theorists have abstracted from the
question of changes in the effects of average
protection relative to excluded countries by assuming
that a CU is formed among countries which then set a
common external tariff equal, in some sense, to the
average tariff in place in the individual countries
pre—union.
Under those assumptions, a CU could be trade
creating or trade diverting. Trade creation would take
place when producers in member countries reduced the
output of their industries previously protected
against imports from CU partners and the rest of the
world, and instead imported from lower—cost member
countries. Trade diversion would occur when countries
replaced imports from low—cost non—member countries
with higher—cost production from member countries.3
When trade creation predominates sufficiently,
there is a strong presumption that welfare of the
member country or countries for which trade is
"created" will improve. This is because the "created"
3me classic analysis is by Lipsey (1960). There
is considerable evidence emerging in developing
countries that increased competition subsequent to
trade liberalization may result in increases in X—
efficiency. That can surely happen as well subsequent
to the formation of CUs and FTAs, but if ROOs do
increase protection to some industries, there is no
increase in competition in those cases, and the issue
is therefore not pertinent to the analysis in this
paper.
3trade shifts production from the higher—cost home
country to the lower—cost partner country.4 When trade
diversion dominates for a given country, there is a
presumption of welfare loss for the country in
question, as the country shifts from low—cost sources
of imports in the rest of the world to sourcing its
imports from its partner country, whose production is
protected by the external tariff. Unless consumption
gains from the arrangement are large enough (because
of lower prices to consumers) to offset the trade
diversion effects, trade diversion leads to a welfare
loss to the importing country.
To be sure, trade diversion could represent a
welfare loss for one CU/FTA country and a welfare gain
for another. An assessment of overall welfare effects
for individual members of the CU could require a
weighting of trade diversion, trade creation, and
consumption effects, as well as the effects of any
terms of trade gain achieved by the trading partners
vis—a—vis the rest of the world.5
41f the partners costs are nonetheless above
costs in the rest of the world, the gain to the home
country would be even greater if it liberalized
multilaterally.
5Kemp and Wan (1976) have shown that it is always
possible for a pattern of tariffs to be established
post—union which would insure at least the same level
of imports and exports from the CU with the rest of
the world; in that case, the CU would clearly be
4The general view has been that CUs and FTAs are
equivalent in these effects: that while CUs differ
from FTAs in having a common external tariff, the
trade diversion and trade creation effects can be
analyzed in similar fashion. Because countries retain
their pre—existing external tariffs in the case of
FTAs, however, it was not thought necessary to assume
that the average tariff remained the same after CU as
before: since no tariff was changed, it was assumed
that that happened. Moreover, that implied that a
country that itself practiced free trade could only
benefit from forming an FTA with another country: it
would gain access to the other country's markets and
pay no costs, since its zero tariffs would lead
producers to choose the low—cost source.
2. Rules of Origin and the Average Height of
Tariffs6
In any CU or FTA negotiation, one of the
critical issues concerns "rules of origin" (ROO). The
ROOs specify a criterion, or criteria, under which
commodities imported by one CU or FTA partner will be
trade—creating.
6The considerations discussed here are relevant
for Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. However, the argument
that much support for the FTA with Mexico is
protectionist in intent is based on the Mexican case.
Hence, to simplify discussion, only the ramifications
of U.S.—Mexican trading relations are considered here.
5deemed to have originated from within the CU or FTA
and thus be eligible for duty—free treatment.
For a CU, ROOs determine eligibility for duty—
free entry from the partner; the tariff is common to
members.7 In an FTA, however, ROOs have an important
additional function. Without a ROO, each imported
commodity would enter through the country with the
lowest tariff on each commodity. If the rule were
simply that some value should have been added in the
country of origin, anything —theaddition of a label,
the final assembly or even the painting of a product -
wouldqualify an item for duty—free entry to the
other country.
The criteria adopted in ROOs can take a variety
of forms. One simple and frequently—used ROO is that,
in order to qualify as originating in the partner
country, the item must change tariff classifications.
"TheEuropean Community, for example, has
protected its semiconductor industry by determining
that origin is assigned to the country where "a
product has been. wholly obtained or where it has
undergone its last substantial working or processing".
It then defined the "last substantial processing" to
have taken place with diffusion. Diffusion, however,
is such an early stage that it is not technically
feasible to initiate fabrication in any place other
than where diffusion is performed. The net impact was
that non—EC producers had to invest in fabrication
facilities within the EC to avoid border duties. See
Official Journal of the European Community, Vol. 32,
February, 1989, P. 23.
6Another is that the item must have undergone
"substantial transformation'. Yet another is that a
specified percentage of the commoditys sales price
must consist of value added in the partner country. A
fourth ROO specifies a percentage of purchased parts
and components that must be purchased from CU or FTA
members.
The criterion for duty—free treatmentis
important in determining the economic effects of the
ROO. The incentives provided to producers hoping to
export to their trading partners obviously vary with
the ROO as well as with the structure of tariffs: if
materials, but not labor, are counted in establishing
origin, there is an incentive to substitute materials.
If domestic labor, but not capital, is included in the
calculation, the incentive to substitute labor for
capital is evidently present.
Even in these relatively simple cases, further
elaboration of the ROO is needed. When the ROO is
stated in terms of fraction of parts and components,
for example, the question then is shifted back one
step to determining how much domestic value added
there must be in a given part or component for it to
count as domestic.8 When domestic value added is the
criterion, the precise criterion for attributing
8This was the issue in the now—famous Honda case
where the U.S. challenged the eligibility of Canadian—
produced Hondas to quality for duty—free treatment
into the American market.
7capital costs must be specified.9 Even accounting
practices for allocating joint costs must be agreed
upon.
Until negotiation of the NAFTA agreement, the
United States used the percentage of domestic value
added as its criterion for duty—exempt eligibility
under the U.S.—Canada FTA, but counted only labor
costs, and not any imputed capital costs.1°
ROOs agreed upon in forming an FTA in fact
extend the protection accorded by each country to
producers in other FTA member countries. As such, ROOs
can constitute a source of bias toward economic
inefficiency in FTAs in a way they cannot do with
Under NAFTA, it has evidently been agreed that
a part or component that is more than 50 percent
domestic value added will be counted as domestic value
added, and interest costs on machinery used in
production will also constitute domestic value added.
10How rules of origin are actually administered
may also affect their protective content. If, for
example, the U.S. authorities take the average value
added within the FTA over all a firm's output of a
product in question, there could even be a reduction
in earlier Mexican exports to third countries as it
was no longer profitable to export when purchasing
intermediate goods from the U.S. It is reported that
EFTA producers appear willing to pay duties averaging
at least six percent of price in order to avoid the
paperwork needed to establish origin. See Hoekman and
Leidy (1992b), p. 19.
8customs union.11 Moreover, a country with a zero—
tariff level pre—FTA could find its producers post—FTA
diverting their imports from low—cost third—country
sources to the partner country in order to be eligible
for FTA treatment of their exports to the partner
country. ROOs governing treatment of Mexicos exports
to the United States, for example, can induce
efficient Mexican producers to shift their imports
from low—cost third country suppliers to higher—cost
United States sources, EVEN IF THERE ARE NO MEXICAN
TARIFFS ON THE IMPORTS OF THOSE COMMODITIES.12
The United States can, at least in theory,
therefore use an FTA agreement to gain protection for
its industries in Mexican markets! Rather than
inducing Mexican firms to switch to U.S. tariff—free
sources because they are then cheaper than low—cost
but tariff ridden world sources —thetraditional
trade diversion case —anFTA could induce Mexican
producers to shift their purchases of intermediate
inputs knowingly from a low—cost world supplier to a
higher cost U.S. supplier in order to qualify for
Rules of origin are also present in customs
union and can, of course, bias production decisions.
But since external tariffs are similar across
countries, they cannot generate the sort of bias
discussed here. They then become equivalent to
domestic content requirements. See Grossman (1981) for
an analysis.
12This could not happen in the case of a customs
union because the external tariff would be common.
9duty—free importation of the final product into the
U.S. market. Additional Mexican imports to the U.S.
might be incorrectly regarded as trade—creating when
in fact they would result from the protection in U.S.
tariffs being extended to Mexican products entering
the U.S. An FTA can also induce the development of
production facilities in an FTA partner, even when the
partner's own external tariff would make such
facilities uneconomic.
ROOs can thus provide protection to one country's
higher cost producers in another country's markets
even when the latter's tariff structure, when taken by
itself, results in imports from the rest of the world
being lower cost.
3. Profit—Maximizing Behavior under ROOs
Customs unions have rules of origin13 but when
there is an FTA, the issue is especially important
13However, the phenomenon noted here, i.e. the
ability of a rule of origin to make it profitable to
switch from a lower—cost source to a higher—cost
source, could not happen under a customs union because
the external tariff rates would be common to both
countries. While a Mexican producer might therefore
find himself with higher input costs after a customs
union than before, any shift to a U.S. source would be
the normal trade diversion variety. Under an FTA, it
is the difference in tariff rates, combined with the
rule of origin, that gives rise to the possibility of
a profitable shift to a source which is higher—cost to
the buyer.
10because, by definition, external tariffs differ
between partner countries.A ROO may make it
profitable to establish production facilities in
Mexico, even though at pre—existing Mexican tariff
rates such facilities are uneconomic. Alternatively,
it may pay Mexican producers to pay more for some or
all of their intermediate goods from higher—priced
U.S. sources than to pay less to lower—cost world
sources. The choice will clearly depend on relative
costs in Mexico and the U.S., and analysis is
straightforward.
The interesting case is when the U.S. has a
significant cost advantage relative to Mexico but a
cost disadvantage vis—a—vis the rest of the world in
an intermediate commodity, and is able implicitly to
extend her tariffs (or other protective devices) to
the Mexican market through aROO.The exact
specification of the ROO was one of the last sticking
points of theNAFTAagreement.14Inthose
negotiations, the United States was supporting a more
stringent ROO while Canada and Mexico were in favor of
a lower percentage and a broader definition. It
therefore seems evident that the United States was
indeed attempting to provide protection to some U.S.
producers in the Mexican market, thus 'exporting"
American protection despite low Mexican tariff rates.
14The Chapter on ROOs of the NAFTA was 193 pages
long in the draft of September 6, 1992.
11This can readily be seen. Profit—maximizing
producers of cloth in Mexico choose f, the fraction of
textiles purchased from the U.S., to maximize
=- Pfy-P(1-f)y (1)
where p is price
tisthetariff rate(ortariff
equivalent)
w and us subscripts denote the world and
the U.S.
c, x superscripts denote clothing and
textiles
f =fractionof textiles purchased from
U.S. sources
y =internationalvalue of textiles
purchased per dollar of clothing at
international prices (y < I)
r =ruleof origin stated as a proportion
of sale price of clothing
rjX— /1 _X\ X U8 — USI W
= 1if P -P(i-f)y< r
=1+ t if P -P(1-f)y￿ r
The world price of textiles, Pd', can be used as
a numeraire and set equal to one. Then, it is evident
that producers in the FTA partner country will choose
to satisfy the rule of origin whenever
1 +— (1÷t)fy> 1—fy (2)
12But the left—hand side of equation (2) is nothing
other than the protection to domestic value added in
the United States; while the right hand side is value
added per unit of cloth output at international




which is the criterion for positive effective
protection in the United States.
The higher the effective rate of protection in
the United States for a given commodity, the more it
will pay Mexican producers to buy intermediate goods
from U.S. sources despite lower foreign (Mexican
tariff—inclusive) prices. To be sure, as Mexican
producers increase their sales in the U.S., the price
of their export in the U.S. will fall while the
marginal cost of production in Mexico will rise. An
equilibrium eventually will be reached in which the
ex—ante profits are eliminated, but it may well be an
equilibrium in which Mexican producers continue to buy
from U.S. sources to enable them to sell at tariff—
inclusive prices.
This result can be illustrated with an
arithmetic example. It is assumed that the United
States is exporting its protection on intermediate
goods to Mexico, although a similar example could
readily be constructed for Mexico to be doing the same
13thing: indeed, it is possible that rules of origin in
an FTA could export protection in some markets in each
country to the other country. Table I gives some
hypothetical numbers for Mexican and U.S. tariffs and
inputs of intermediates before and after an FTA comes
into effect.
The assumptions are all listed at the top of
Table 1. It is assumed that the ROO is set in terms of
a percentage of purchased parts and components. To
assume a value added criterion would complicate the
example needlessly, but the principle would remain
unaltered.
It is assumed that, pre—FTA, Mexico imports all
components duty—free from the rest of the world (ROW)
at international prices, and assembles autos, using
$600 of components (valued at either world or domestic
prices) to make an auto. In the United States,
automobiles are subject to a 50 percent tariff, while
brakes and motors are subject to 40 percent nominal
tariff and tires and batteries 50 percent. This gives
rise to a 61.25 percent effective rate of protection
for American automobile manufacturers: they must pay
$855 for their components, or 42.5 percent more than
the world price but they receive 1.5 times the world
price for their output.
After the formation of an FTA, Mexican producers
have two choices. On one hand, they can continue to
buy all their inputs in the world market; if they do
so, they do not meet the ROO. Hence their product is
14subject to a 50 percent duty on entry into the U.S,
and they receive $1000 per auto exported. On the other
hand, they can shift from purchasing components from
the ROW to purchasing enough of them in the U.S. to
meet the ROO.
The right hand side of table 1 shows ex—ante
profits from shifting components purchases from ROW to
the U.S. in response to a ROO of 80 percent. At that
ROO, Mexicans auto assemblers could sell in the U.S.
market at $1,500 buying motors and brakes from the
U.S. at prices 40 percent above that of their foreign
suppliers. That would meet the ROO, even though
batteries and tires (with a 50 percent duty) were
still purchased abroad. At a 90 percent ROO, tires
purchases would be shifted toward FTA—member origin.
And, at 100 per cent ROO, it would pay Mexican
producers to purchase all components in the U.S. in
order to be eligible for duty—exemption on auto
exports to the U.S.
To see how a higher rule of origin is more
protective, note that art 80 percent ROO extends the 40
percent nominal rate of protection to the Mexican
market, but leaves batteries and tires unprotected.
With a 90 percent ROO, tires are subject to 50 percent
nominal protection in Mexico as well as in the U.S.
Clearly also, a higher rate of protection on
intermediate goods, or a lower nominal rate of
protection on the final commodity in the U.S. market
would be consistent with inducing Mexican producers to
15shift from world sources to higher—cost (to them, as
well as to the country) U.S. sources.
Rules of origin can have similar effects even if
there is positive effective protection in Mexico prior
to the FTA, provided that the Mexican price of the
final good is below the U.S. price pre—FTA.
If one ex—ante attempted to assess the trade
creation and trade diversion aspects of the FTA with
respect to textiles and clothing, from a U.S.
perspective, there would appear to have been trade
creation as Mexican exports of clothing to the U.S.
increased. From a Mexican perspective, there might
appear to have been trade creation if total imports of
textiles increased (because the volume of clothing
production increased as exports to the U.S. expanded)
or trade diversion (despite the absence of an external
tariff).
More generally, producers of a final good in an
FTA would find it advantageous to purchase higher—cost
(protected) inputs from other FTA members than to
purchase from lower cost ROW sources whenever: I) the
effective rate of protection in the partner country
was greater than in the home country; and 2) the rule
of origin would not be satisfied without such
purchases.
4. How Protectionist is the NAFTA?
It has often been argued that such a high
fraction of Mexicos trade is with the United States
16that Mexico is bound to gain by an FTA. That judgment
may well be correct. But there are some indications
that American intent was to secure as much advantage
for U.S. producers in the Mexican market as possible.
One piece of evidence is the report that American
negotiators evidently tried to insist that Mexico not
lower her tariff structure any further from its
present average of about 9 percent.15 The higher are
Mexican tariffs, the more advantage U.S. firms have
relative to foreign competitors in the Mexican market,
and the more trade diversion is likely to occur.
But ROOs were also a major issue in the
negotiations. The full text of the NAFTA agreement has
not yet been made public, but enough details are known
to be suggestive. In at least two key sectors, ROOs
are clearly important and were a major point of
contention until the final hours of negotiations.
First, for automobiles and parts, the ROO was set at
62.5 percent, a number which will be reached gradually
over eight years starting at 50 percent (the number in
the U.S. Canada Agreement16) when the pact goes into
15Financial Times, June 9, 1992, P. 14.
l6 see how important administration can be, the
United States is reported to have achieved the 62.5
percent rule, but to have conceded on how it is
calculated. The full cost of processing materials, and
interest costs on machinery and equipment had not been
counted as part of domestic value added under the
earlier U.S.—Canada interpretation and would be under
the new ruling. This, in effect, would mean that Honda
17effect.17Both Mexico and Canada had attempted to
bargain for lower numbers.18 Expectations evidently
are that Volkswagen will locate more operations in
Mexico in order to comply with the requirement, while
Japanese firms will have greater difficulty in meeting
it, and potential new Mexican producers will be
greatly discouraged from entry.19 It is noteworthy
that Canada agreed to the higher ROO only after the
United States accepted a revision of the way in which
FTA value added is calculated: the U.S. agreed to
include interest and other capital costs, as well as
labor costs.2°
had met the 50 percent FTA origin rule and would not
be liable for duties, as it would have been had the
old U.S. formula continued to prevail.New York Times,
August 15, 1992, P. 26.
17New York Times, August 13, 1992, p. C3. The ROO
for new contracts is somewhat more restrictive. See
Hufbauer and Schott (1992) for a discussion.
18See Financial Times, July 24, 1992, P.4.
19Financial Times, June 18, 1992, P. 6.
20The Honda dispute with Canada was over
interpretation of rules of origin. The U.S. Customs
Department "found that the engine blocks, produced in
Marysville, Ohio, and exported to Canada for re—export
to the U.S., did not contain sufficient North American
content." It was further reported that Canadian and
American authorities were still in disagreement over
what constituted domestic content. See Financial
Times, March 3, 1992.
18In textiles and clothing, as well, ROOs were an
important issue. There, the agreement calls for duty—
free treatment of Mexican garments only if the yarn is
made, the cloth woven, and all cutting and sewing is
done in North America.21
To be sure, there are other sectors of the
American economy that will be opened, at least to some
degree, as a result of the NAFTA agreement. U.S.
restrictions on Mexican fruit and vegetables appear to
have been relaxed considerably, and that will almost
certainly resultintrade creation.Financial
liberalization, tariff reductions, and other measures
will also move in that direction.
Overall, however, it is clear that there are
-some fairly strong measures designed to provide
protection to U.S. producers in the NAFTA agreement.
Despite Mexico's position as a "natural" trading
partner, one must question the extent to which the
NAFTA is truly a step toward a more open, multilateral
trading system, or whether it is a step toward greater
U.S. protectionism encompassing not only the United
States but all of North America.
21New York Times, Aug. 13, 1992, P. C3. Canada
evidently won a partial exemption from this 'bottoms
up" rule for clothing.
195. What is the Political Economy of Rules of Origin?
There remains a political economy puzzle. That
is, conventional wisdom is that tariffs are escalated,
with higher nominal rates of protection of final
commodities than of intermediate goods, and higher
nominal rates on intermediate goods than on raw
materials. Yet, at first sight it would appear that
the chief gainers in the United States from ROOs would
be U.S. producers of intermediate goods. Why should
U.S. producers of final products, such as automobiles,
be "gleeful"22 at higher ROOs for eligibility for
entry into the U.S. market? For that matter, why was
it widely believed that a higher ROO would exclude
Japanese automobile producers, such as Nissan, from
the U.S. market?
The answer must lie, at least in part, in
production relations, and the ways in which parts and
components must be "designed in" to final products. To
the extent that Nissan, for example, is designed with
specifications of Japanese parts and components, an
attempt to shift to a Mexican, Canadian, or U.S.
supplier would involve the start—up of a new
production facility. Such a facility may not be able
to produce at the same costs as are incurred in Japan;
moreover, if there is monopolistic competition, and
fixed costs to be covered in the production of parts
and components, the North American market for Nissan
22Financial Times, August 18, 1992, P. 4.
20autos may not be large enough to permit profitably
averaging fixed costs and still be profitable. If any
of these speculations are correct, the ROO does
protect producers of the final product in avoiding
competition from those with access to cheaper
intermediate goods. The price to the final producers
of receiving that protection, however, is that they
must share part of it with producers of intermediate
goods in the FTA.23
As producers of final commodities avoid some
competition andreceive protection,theyare
presumably willing to pay higher prices for purchased
inputs to continue to enjoy that protection. Once that
is recognized, a rule of origin may be a device
through which producers of final goods and those of
intermediate goods can be induced to support an FTA.
If so, then the political economy of FTAs suggests
that they are as likely to be protectionist as they
are to be trade creating.
23See Hoekman and Leidy (1992a) for an alternative
interpretation, focussing upon sharing rents between
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